Mediated encryption: analysis and design by Elashry, I et al.
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences -
Papers: Part A Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences
2015
Mediated encryption: analysis and design
I Elashry
University of Wollongong, ifeae231@uowmail.edu.au
Y Mu
University of Wollongong, ymu@uow.edu.au
W Susilo
University of Wollongong, wsusilo@uow.edu.au
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
Elashry, I., Mu, Y. & Susilo, W. (2015). Mediated encryption: analysis and design. EAI Endorsed Transactions on Security and Safety,
15 (3), e2.
Mediated encryption: analysis and design
Abstract
Boneh, Ding and Tsudik presented identity-based mediated RSA encryption and signature systems in which
the users are not allowed to decrypt/sign messages without the authorisation of a security mediator.We show
that ID-MRSA is not secure and we present a secure modified version of it which is as efficient as the original
system. We also propose a generic mediated encryption that translates any identity based encryption to a
mediated version of this IBE. It envelops an IBE encrypted message using a user’s identity into an IBE
envelope using the identity of the SEM. We present two security models based on the role of the adversary
whether it is a revoked user or a hacked SEM. We prove that GME is as secure as the SEM’s IBE against a
revoked user and as secure as the user’s IBE against a hacked SEM. We also present two implementations of
GME based on Boneh-Franklin FullIBE system which is a pairing-based system and Boneh, Gentry and
Hamburg (BGH) system which is pairing-free system.
Disciplines
Engineering | Science and Technology Studies
Publication Details
Elashry, I., Mu, Y. & Susilo, W. (2015). Mediated encryption: analysis and design. EAI Endorsed Transactions
on Security and Safety, 15 (3), e2.
This journal article is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/5388
Mediated Encryption: Analysis and Design∗
I. Elashry, Y. Mu and W. Susilo
University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia 2500
Abstract
Boneh, Ding and Tsudik presented identity-based mediated RSA encryption and signature systems in which
the users are not allowed to decrypt/sign messages without the authorisation of a security mediator. We show
that ID-MRSA is not secure and we present a secure modified version of it which is as efficient as the original
system. We also propose a generic mediated encryption that translates any identity based encryption to a
mediated version of this IBE. It envelops an IBE encrypted message using a user’s identity into an IBE envelope
using the identity of the SEM. We present two security models based on the role of the adversary whether it
is a revoked user or a hacked SEM. We prove that GME is as secure as the SEM’s IBE against a revoked user
and as secure as the user’s IBE against a hacked SEM. We also present two implementations of GME based
on Boneh-Franklin FullIBE system which is a pairing-based system and Boneh, Gentry and Hamburg (BGH)
system which is pairing-free system.
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1. Introduction
For the last few years, the key revocation problem has
received the attention of the cryptography community
because the user’s public key cannot be used if
the corresponding private key is compromised. This
problem occurs in public key cryptography because
it depends on digital certificates. Digital certificates
are signatures issued by a trusted certificate authority
(CA) that securely ties together a number of quantities.
Typically, these quantities contain at least the ID of
a user (U ) and its public key (P K). Frequently, the
CA comprises a serial number (SN ) for managing
certificates. The CA also binds the certificates to an
issue date D1 and an expiration date D2. By issuing the
signature of SigCA(U, PK, SN,D1, D2), the CA provides
P K between the current date D1 and the future date D2.
A user’s public key may have to be revoked
before its expiration date D2 if a user’s secret key
is accidentally leaked or an attacker successfully
compromises it. A new key pair should be generated
and the corresponding certificate should be issued.
If the CA can revoke a certificate, then third
parties cannot depend on this certificate unless the CA
HThis paper is an extended version of the paper entitled ‘Generic
Mediated Encryption’ in Securecomm 2013.
shares certificate status information indicating whether
this certificate is still valid. This certificate status
information has to be recently generated and must
be widely distributed. Sharing a great deal of fresh
certificates periodically leads to the key revocation
problem which consumes large amount of computation
power and bandwidth. This is considered a hindrance
to global application of public-key cryptography.
1.1. Some Previous Solutions to the Key Revocation
Problem
The most widely-known and a very ineffective way
to solve the key revocation problem is the certificate
revocation list (CRL) [10, 23] which is a list that
contains revoked certificates. The CA produces this list
periodically with its signature. Because the CA will
probably revoke many of its certificates -say 10 %-
if they are produced for a validity time of one year
[14, 20], the CRL will be too lengthy if the CA has many
clients. Moreover, the complete CRL must be sent to
any party that needs to carry out a certificate status
check. There are improvements to this approach such
as delta CRLs [5] which lists only those certificates
revoked since the CA’s last update. But the consumed
transmission bandwidth and computation costs of the
transmission of these lists are still very high. Another
method of solving the key revocation problem is the
1
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online certificate status protocol (OCSP) [18]. If a client
wants to check certificate status, he sends to the CA a
certificate status query. The CA replies to this query by
producing a fresh signature on the certificate’s current
status. This omits the need to send a list of all revoked
certificates and reduces the transmission costs to a
single signature per query but it significantly increases
computation costs. It also negatively affects security.
If the CA is centralised, the system will have a single
point of failure and consequently will become highly
vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [14, 20].
Kocher [17] suggested an improved version of OCSP
called certificate revocation trees (CRTs). The CA can
be considered as a global service provider and must
be replicated using many servers in order to stand
the entire load of certificate validation requests. The
CA’s signing key must be distributed securely over
many servers. This process is expensive and insecure.
A solution to this problem is that a highly secure root
CA sends a signed CRL-like data structure to other
less-secure servers and then clients can query these
servers for their certificate validation requests. The data
structure is like a tree where the leaves are the revoked
certificates and the root is a signature of the highly
secure root CA. This structure is called a certificate
revocation tree (CRT). If a user wants to check the
validity of a certificate, he sends a request to the nearest
less-secure CA server.
A disadvantage of the current CRT structure is that
the whole CRT must be recalculated and sent to all
servers if a new certificate is revoked. This problem
can be solved if the CRT can be updated without the
need to recalculate it. 2-3 trees proposed by Naor and
Nissim [21], Aiello-Lodha-Ostrovsky [1] and skip-lists
proposed by Goodrich [16] are two proposed solutions
to this problem.
Micali [14, 19, 20] proposed a promising way to
solve this problem. (See also [1, 12, 22].) Similar to
previous PKI proposals, Micali’s Novomodo system
includes a CA, one or more directories (to distribute
the certification information) and the users. Despite
this similarity, it is more efficient than CRLs and OCSP
without sacrificing security.
The advantage of Novomodo over a CRL-based
system is that a directory’s reply to a certificate
status query is brief, only 160 bits per query (if
T has cached SigCA(U, PK, SN,D1, D2, Xn)). On the
other hand, the length of a CRL increases with the
number of certificates that have been revoked (i.e.
number of clients). Novomodo has several advantages
over OCSP. First, Novomodo depends on hashing
while OCSP depends on signing. Because hashing
has lower computation costs than signing, the CA’s
computational costs in Novomodo is typically much
lower. Second, the directories in Novomodo do not have
to be trusted unlike the distributed components of an
OCSP CA. Instead of issuing signatures depending on
third parties, the directories publish only hashed pre-
images sent by the CA (which cannot be produced by
Novomodo directories). Third, the directories do not
perform any online computation and make Novomodo
less vulnerable to DoS attacks. Finally, although OCSP
does not consume too much bandwidth, Novomodo’s
bandwidth consumption is typically even lower since
public-key signatures are typically longer than 160 bits
(length of Xn−i sent per query).
A disadvantage of all the above techniques is relaying
on third-party queries [14]. It is preferable to eliminate
third-party queries for several reasons. First, since
anyone can ask for third-party queries, each certificate
server must be able to get the certificate status of every
client in the system. The situation is much simpler if
third-party queries are eliminated. Each server is only
required to have certification proofs for the clients that
it works for. In addition, multi-cast can be used to push
certificate proofs to clients to reduce the transmission
costs. Second, third-party queries multiply the query
computation costs of the CA and/or its servers. For
example, if each client queries the certificate status of
X clients per day, the system must process XN queries
(where N is the number of clients). Third, from a
business model perspective, non-client queries are not
recommended because if T is not a client of the CA,
he will not be motivated to deliver T fresh certificate
status information. Finally, since the CA must reply to
queries from non-clients, it becomes more vulnerable to
DoS attacks and this is a security concern. In summary,
removing third-party queries leads to a reduction in
infrastructure costs, simplifies the business model and
increases security. We can completely remove third-
party queries by using an implicit certification such as
identity-based encryption (IBE).
The notion of identity-based cryptography was put
forth by Shamir [25]. In the same paper, Shamir also
proposed a concrete construction of an identity-based
signature system. Identity-based cryptography offers
the advantage of simplifying public key management
as it eliminates the need for public key certificates. In
Shamir’s seminal paper, he successfully achieved this
goal by designing an identity-based signature based on
RSA but not identity-based encryption since sharing
a common modulus between different users makes
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RSA insecure. Examples of RSA cryptanalysis with the
same modulus used for different encryption/decryption
pairs are [3, 26]. Sixteen years later, Sakai, Ohgishi
and Kasahara [24] proposed the first identity-based
cryptography and independently Boneh and Franklin
[7] proposed the first reliable and provable identity-
based cryptography based on Weil pairings over
elliptic curves. Cocks [9] presented a system that is
based on factorisation of a composite integer. These
cryptosystems opened a new era in cryptography.
Gentry presented the notion of certificate-based
encryption (CBE) [14]. This system combines public-
key encryption (PKE) and IBE while keeping most
of the advantages of each. Using PKE, each client
creates its own public-key/secret-key pair and asks for
a certificate from the CA. The CA uses an IBE system
to create the certificate. This certificate has all of the
functionality of a conventional PKI certificate as well
as a decryption key. This double encryption gives us
implicit certification. If T wants to encrypt a message,
it double encrypts it using PKI and IBE and then the
decryptor uses both his secret key and an up-to-date
certificate from his CA to decrypt the message. CBE
has no escrow (since the CA does not know the user’s
secret key) and it does not a have secret key distribution
problem because the CA’s certificate needs not be kept
secret. Although CBE consumes less computation and
transmission costs than Novomodo, it is preferable to
completely eliminate the use of certificates to preserve
the infrastructure costs.
Boneh, Ding, Tsudik and Wong were the first to
introduce the notion of mediated cryptosystems in
[6]. They designed a variant of RSA that allows an
immediate revocation of, for instance, an employee’s
key by an employer for any reason. Their system
is the first to propose a secure variant of identity-
based RSA that shares a common modulus between
different users. Their system is based on the so-called
security mediator (SEM) architecture in which the
SEM is a semi-trusted server. If an employee wants
to decrypt/sign a message, he must co-operate with
the SEM to do so. The idea behind their system is
splitting the secret key of an employee between the
employee himself and the SEM. Hence, without the
SEM cooperation, the employee cannot sign or encrypt
messages. This is also helpful to monitor the security
of sent/received secure messages in the company. Later
on, Ding and Tsudik presented a security proof for these
systems. In particular, they stated that ‘IB-mRSA/OAEP
encryption offers equivalent the semantic security to
RSA/OAEP against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks
in the random oracle model if the key generation
function is division intractable’. To make the key
generation function division intractable, Ding and
Tsudik used a division intractable hash function to
generate division intractable public keys.
The SEM architecture was proven useful [6] to sim-
plify signature validation and enable key revocation in
legacy systems. Although this system does not require a
CA to create a certificate or send certificate status infor-
mation and the computation and transmission costs are
kept to minimum, it has two major security concerns.
First, There is a security flaw in [11, 15]. Second, since
SEM is centralised, it represents a single point of failure
for the system and hence the system is vulnerable to
DOS attacks. Moreover, a hacked SEM can be a major
threat to the system security because the SEM is a semi-
trusted server.
1.2. Our Contribution
First, we investigate the mediated encryption [6,
11] by reviewing the security of the ID-MRSA. We
show that hashing users’ identities using a division
intractable hash function does not necessarily generate
division intractable public keys. We show that an
insider attacker can breach the ID-MRSA even if the
hash function used is division intractable. We present
two solutions that make the key generation function
division intractable and hence, the ID-MRSA is secure.
Second, we take the work of [6] one step further and
present a generic mediation system that is capable of
making any IBE system support key revocation. This
idea is based on a letter-envelope technique. If UA
wants to encrypt a message to UB, he first encrypts it
normally using UB’s identity (letter) then he encrypts
the letter again using SEM identity (envelope) and
sends the resulted ciphertext to UB. To decrypts the
ciphertext, UB sends the message to the SEM. If UB
is revoked, the SEM will not open the envelope for
him. If UB is not revoked, the SEM will open the
envelope and send the letter to UB who decrypts the
message using his private key. The structure of our
system combines the advantages of both Gentry [14]
and Boneh et al. [6]. It completely eliminates the use of
certificates. In addition, the SEM in our system is not
a single point of failure. If the SEM is compromised,
the system can continue working using the user’s IBE
system. In addition, all messages sent to the SEM before
or after an attack are safe and secure. Through the
paper, U represents the user, S represents the SEM, P
represents the system parameters, Gen represents the
3
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setup algorithm, KG is the Key Generation Algorithm,
Enc is the encryption algorithm, Dec is the decryption
algorithm and r is the private key.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Sec. 2
discusses the ID-MRSA encryption/signature systems
and their implementations. Sec. 3 discusses the security
flaw of the ID-MRSA. Sec. 4 proposes two solutions
to overcome the ID-MRSA security flaw. The effect of
using these solutions on the ID-MRSA are discussed in
Sec. 5. Sec. 6 presents the generic mediated encryption
(GME) and its security proof. Sec. 7 presents two
implementations of GME, the first one is based on the
BF IBE system [7] which is a pairing-based system and
the second one is based on the BGH system [8] which
is not a pairing-based system. The last section presents
the conclusions of the paper.
2. The ID-MRSA
We review the structure of ID-MRSA as follows. In the
setup phase, PKG produces two safe primes p, q then
computes n = pq. He preserves p, q as secret system
parameters while makes the modulus n public. Next,
PKG produces the private key for UA by hashing his
identity to a value KG() then the PKG pads KG() with
one to get an odd public key forUA. After that, he makes
the corresponding full RSA private key forUA and splits
it between UA and the SEM. UB encrypts message m to
UA normally using the public key of UA. After getting
the encrypted message C from UB, UA directs it to the
SEM to partially decrypt it. If UA is revoked, the SEM
declines to decrypt the message and returns ‘error’.
Otherwise, the SEM partially decrypts the message
to get PDS and sends it to UA. After receiving the
partially decrypted message PDS from the SEM, UA
computes his own partially decrypted version of the
message PDU and then combines it with the SEM’s
partially decrypted message to get his fully decrypted
message. The algorithms of key generation, encryption
and decryption are shown below. The signature system
has the same key generation as the encryption system.
When UA signs a message to UB, he sends it to the
SEM to partially sign the message for him if he is not
revoked. UA combines the partially signed message of
the SEM with his partially signed version of the message
to get his own signature. UB can verify the signature of
UA normally as RSA.
3. The ID-MRSA Security
The ID-MRSA is assumed to be secure in the random
oracle model based on [15] and [11]. However, there
Key Generation:
Input: two safe primes p and q
Output: rU , rS
n = pq (Generating the modulus)
for U do
s = k − |KG()| − 1
e = 0s ||KG()||1 (Padding the hashed identity
with one)
r = 1e (mod ϕ(n)) (Calculating the private key r)
rU
R← Zn − [0] (Choosing randomly an element
rU from Zn − [0])
rS = (r − rU ) (mod ϕ(n))
end
Encryption:
Input: n, k, KG()
Output: C
s = k − |KG()| − 1
e = 0s ||KG()||1
C = Encrypt the message using RSA/OAEP
Decryption:
Input: C, rU , rS
Output: m
for S do




PDS = CrS (mod n) (Calculate the partially
decrypted message of the SEM)
end
for U do
PDU = CrU (mod n) (Calculate the partially
decrypted message of U)
M = (PDS × PDU ) (mod n) (Decrypt the
message)
end
m = OAEP Decoding of M
is a special attack that an insider user can initiate. He
can modify the encrypted message so that it can be
decrypted using his private key by finding a mapping
function f (CA) = CB.
Lemma 1. Assume that there are two users UA and UB,
UB is able to obtain a mapping function f (CA) = CB and
decrypt/forge the encrypted message/signed message
of UA iff ea|eb.
This lemma and its proof are presented in [11]. If
ea|eb i.e. eb = k × ea, we can build a mapping function
f such that f (a) = ak (mod n). To protect the system
4
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Signing:








PDS = hrS (mod n)
end
for U do
PDU = crU (mod n)
S = (PDS × PDU ) (mod n)
end
Verification:
Input: h, S, n, k, KG()
Output: h
s = k − |KG()| − 1
e = 0s ||KG()||1
h = Se (mod n)
if h , h then
return (ERROR)
end
against this attack, the user’s public key cannot be
a factor of the product of the other users’ public
keys. To ensure that, Ding and Tsudik used a division
intractable hash function to map a user’s identity to his
public key (KG()). This notion of division intractable
hash functions was presented by Gennaro et al. [13].
A hash function H() is division intractable if it is




In this section, we prove that the ID-MRSA is
still vulnerable to this attack. A division intractable
hash function does not necessarily produce division
intractable public keys because the output of the
hash function KG() is padded with a ‘one’. The
public key is e = KG()‖1 [11] or e = KG()‖00000001
[4]. This means that e = 2KG() + 1 or e = 8KG() + 1.
This multiplication and addition completely change
the property of the public key and it is likely,
with overwhelming probability, to no more becoming
division intractable. For example, if |KG(ID1)| = 6 and
|KG(ID2)| = 19, these two values are division intractable
but if we calculate e1 = 2|KG(ID1)| + 1 = 2 × 6 + 1 = 13
and e2 = 2|KG(ID2)| + 1 = 2 × 19 + 1 = 39 we can see
that e1 and e2 are no longer division intractable (e2 =
3e1) and consequently, lemma 1 can be used to attack







the ID-MRSA even though the hash function is division
intractable. Real life values that represent the same
idea are shown in table 1. These numbers are in
hexadecimal.
We now demonstrate how an insider one-wayness
adversary takes advantage of this simple notice to
initiate two different attacks against the ID-MRSA. The
first attack is a direct application of lemma 1. The
second attack is a common modulus attack against the
ID-MRSA. For the signature system, we prove that if
such a mapping function exists, an insider attacker can
forge the signature of another user without knowing his
private key.
3.1. Attacks on the ID-MRSA Encryption
The first attack holds when the effect of using an
intractable hash function is canceled by padding the
output with one and the resulting public keys are in the
form of (eB = k × eA). Under these conditions, UB can




and then decrypt this message using his private key.
This attack is executed as follows:
• The attacker UB chooses an identity IDB such that
eB = k × eA where k is an integer.
• At the challenge phase,UB sends to the challenger
any two messagesm0 andm1 and the identity IDA.
• The challenger tosses a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1} and
sends CA ← Enc(mb) to UB.
• UB calculates CB = C
eB/eA
A (mod n).
• UB sends CB to the SEM for decryption.
• After decryption, UB can successfully find b′ = b.
The gravity of this attack is that it makes the ID-MRSA
exposed against a one-wayness adversary; not only can
UB distinguish between two messages m0 and m1, he
can decrypt it as a message of his own.
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The second attack can be applied if the same message
was sent to two users, UA and UB, UC with public key
satisfies gcd(eA, eB)|eC can launch an attack to decrypt
this message as follows.
• Assuming that g = gcd(eA, eB)|eC , UC finds the
values of a and b such that a × eA + b × eB = g
using the extended euclidian algorithm.
• After obtaining a and b, UC calculates Cg = C
a
A ×
CbB (mod n) = m
aeA+beB (mod n) = mg (mod n)




= mgec/g (mod n)
= mec (mod n)
and then he can decrypt it using his private key.
3.2. The attack on the ID-MRSA signature
In this subsection, we demonstrate an attack on the ID-
MRSA signature system even with a division intractable
hash function. We assume that there are two users, UA
and UB and show that UB can forge the signature of UA
without knowing his private key using the following
steps, as long as a mapping function between their
public keys exists:
• UB signs the message m with the SEM using his
private key.
• After obtaining his signed message (mB), he
calculates the forged signature of UA: mA = m
k
B
(mod n) where k = eB/eA.
• mA can be verified using the public key of UA.
The proof of the correctness of this attack is described
as follows:
ebhb = 1 (mod ϕ(n))
eb = kea
keahb = 1 (mod ϕ(n))
ea(khb) = 1 (mod ϕ(n))
eaha = 1 (mod ϕ(n))
4. The ID-MRSA-V2
After showing the security flaw of the ID-MRSA
encryption/signature systems, we present two solutions
that correctly make the ID-MRSA secure against these
types of attacks. We denote the ID-MRSA with these
solutions as the ID-MRSA-V2. Any solution to these
attacks must satisfy the following conditions:
• There is a deterministic one-to-one mapping
function that maps the identities of the users to
their public keys.
• This function must be division intractable.
• The produced public keys must be co-prime with
ϕ(n).
The first solution ensures that the maximum value
of a public key is less than three times the smallest
public key value, i.e. eM < 3em. The subscriptM denotes
maximum while the subscript m denotes minimum.
One can see that this completely eliminates the
problem. The relation between the hash function of the
maximum and minimum public keys values must be:
eM < 3em
2|KGM | + 1 < 3(2|KGm| + 1)
2|KGM | + 1 < 6|KGm| + 3
2|KGM | < 6|KGm| + 2
|KGM | < 3|KGm| + 1
If the inequality |KGM | < 3|KGM | + 1 holds, then all
public keys are division intractable. The disadvantage
of this solution is that it limits the space of the hash
function. The other solution to fix this security flaw
is mapping the users’ identities to public keys that
are primes. To generate primes from identities, we
first calculate a = H(ID) and then apply the following
function:
f (a) = (a − 1) × step + 1.
where step is the value used to generate unique primes.
After that, find the next smallest prime larger than f (a).
The algorithm is shown as follows.
a = H(ID)
f (a) = (a − 1) × step + 1
if f (a) is not prime then
f (a) =NxPrime(f (a))
end
return (f (a))
where NxP rime(x) is a function that finds the
smallest prime larger than x.
This function must satisfy the following conditions:
6
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Figure 1. The distribution of primes
• The hash function must be collision resistant i.e.
it is unfeasible to find two different values X, Y
such that a = H(Y ) = H(X). This guarantees that
each identity is mapped to a unique public key.
• The value of step is chosen carefully such that
f (a) < Pa < f (a + 1) for any value a. This will
guarantee that each identity will be mapped to a
unique prime. Fig.1 shows this idea. The value of
step can be determined by finding a value greater
than the maximal prime gap which is the gap
larger than the gaps of smaller primes. For primes
less than 240, a value of step greater than 1476 can
be safely used [2].
• If the mapping function satisfies the above
conditions, it will overcome the first attack to
the encryption system because primes satisfy the
division intractable property. However, it cannot
withstand the second attack because the greatest
common divisor (gcd) between primes is one.
The only solution for this attack is not to use
the same OAEP padding when encrypting the
same message to multiple users. For the signature
systems, there is no mapping function exists
between primes and consequently it will be safe
from such attacks. After fixing these drawbacks,
the ID-MRSA-V2 can be proven CCA2 secure
in the random oracle model using the same
methodology explained in [11] or [15].
5. Implementation
The ID-MRSA-V2 was programmed using MIRACL
software C library and its performance was compared
with the ID-MRSA and RSA. The PC used to run these
tests has a processor Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2410M CPU
@ 2.30GHz (4 CPUs) and 4096MB RAM. Table 2 shows
the test results. The results are in ms.
From these results, we can see that:
• The ID-MRSA-V2 has the same performance of the
original ID-MRSA.
• The results of the key generation of RSA are larger
than those of the ID-MRSA and the ID-MRSA-V2
because the key generation of the ID-MRSA and
the ID-MRSA-V2 is for each user and it does not
involve the prime key generation that exists in
RSA key generation.
• The encryption time increases slightly with the
key length so the key length is not problematic.
This can be seen also in the encryption times of
the ID-MRSA and IDMRSA-V2.
• The decryption times are longer than the
encryption times in all systems. This drawback
is actually inherited from RSA because the
decryption keys are extremely large (of the length
of n).
• The times consumed by all these systems are
proportional to the modulus size.
6. Generic Mediated Encryption
In this section, we take the idea of ID-MRSA one step
ahead. Assume that there is a company XYZ and the
security manager of this company wants to upgrade the
currently-used IBE to one that supports key revocation.
The security manager has two options. He can install a
CBE system [14] but he has to uninstall the currently-
used IBE and install a PKE. PKE certificates will
lead to more computation and transmission costs. The
other option is using mediated cryptosystem such as
ID-MRSA [6, 15]. The security manager also has to
uninstall the current IBE system and install ID-MRSA.
The process of uninstalling the currently-used IBE and
installing a new encryption system is time-consuming
and expensive. It is like having a safe with a one-key
lock and you want to replace it with a two-key lock, you
will have to completely remove the old lock and install
the new one. The question we address here is “Is there
a way to make any IBE support key revocation without
having to uninstall it?". We take the idea of ID-MRSA
and make it generic and applicable to any encryption
system. In the following section, we explain the security
model and security proof of GME.
6.1. The Model
Definition 1. A Generic Mediated Encryption is a 6- tuple
of algorithms. These algorithms are (GenS , KGS , GenU ,
KGU , Enc, DecS , DecU ) such that:
• GenU (1k1 ): The private key generator (PKG) runs
the probabilistic IBE key generation algorithm
GenS which takes as input a security parameter
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Table 2. The time results
The Process Modulus Key Size RSA ID-MRSA ID-MRSA-V2
Key Generation
1024 Bits
16 Bits 17.19 0.13 0.11
128 Bits 22.04 0.13 0.13
160 Bits 19.8 0.14 0.14
2048 Bits
16 Bits 128.26 0.17 0.16
128 Bits 130.26 0.14 0.14
160 Bits 127.86 0.16 0.16
Encryption / Verify
1024 Bits
16 Bits 0.03 0.06 0.05
128 Bits 0.03 0.03 0.05
160 Bits 0.03 0.05 0.03
2048 Bits
16 Bits 0.03 0.06 0.06
128 Bits 0.01 0.06 0.05
160 Bits 0.03 0.06 0.06
Decryption / Sign
1024 Bits
16 Bits 0.14 0.12 0.14
128 Bits 0.13 0.13 0.14
160 Bits 0.14 0.13 0.13
2048 Bits
16 Bits 0.22 0.22 0.22
128 Bits 0.23 0.23 0.23
160 Bits 0.22 0.22 0.22
1k1 . It returns MSKS (the first PKG master secret)
and public parameters PS .
• GenU (1k2 ): The PKG runs the probabilistic IBE key
generation algorithm GenU which takes as input
a security parameter 1k2 . It returns MSKU (the
second PKG master secret) and public parameters
PU .
• KGS (MSKS , PS , IDS ): This algorithm generates
the secret key rS for a SEM with identity IDS using
PS and MSKS .
• KGU (MSKU , PU , IDU ): This algorithm generates
the secret key rU for a user with identity IDU
using PU and MSKU .
• Enc(PS , PU , IDU , IDS , m): The probabilistic algo-
rithm Enc takes PS , PU , IDU , IDS , m. It returns
a ciphertext C.
• DecS (PS , rS , C): The deterministic decryption
algorithm DecS takes (PS , rS , C) as input along
with the user revocation status. If the user is
revoked, DecS returns ⊥. Otherwise it returns CU .
• DecU (PU , rU , CU ): The deterministic decryption
algorithm DecU takes (PU , rU , CU ) as input and
returns m.
6.2. Security
Our main concern is the GME security against two
different types of attackers: 1) by a revoked user or 2)
by a hacked SEM. GME must be secure against each
of these individuals considering that each obtains ‘half’
of the information needed to decrypt. Correspondingly,
we define IND-CCA security using two different games.
The adversary selects the game to play. In the first
game, Type 1, the adversary plays the role of a revoked
user. After demonstrating knowledge of the private key
related to his identity, the revoked user can make DecS
queries. In the second game, Type 2, the adversary plays
the role of a compromised SEM. After demonstrating
knowledge of the private key related to his identity, a
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compromised SEM can make DecU queries. We can say
that our system is secure if no adversary can win either
Type 1 or Type 2.
Type 1: The challenger runs GenS (1k1 ) and GenU (1k2 )
and gives PS and PU to the adversary. The adversary
then interleaves key extraction quires and decryption
queries with a single challenge query. These queries are
answered as follows:
• On key extraction queries (MSKU , PU , IDU ,
PS , IDS ), the challenger runs KGU , KGS and
outputs rU and rS corresponding to the identities
IDU and IDS .
• On decryption queries (PS , PU , IDU , IDS , rU , C),
the challenger checks that rU is the private key
related to IDU . If so, it generates rS and outputs
DecU (DecS (C)).
• On challenge query (PS , PU , ID∗S , ID
∗
U , m0, m1), the
challenger checks that r∗U is the private key related
to ID∗U . Then, upon receiving two messages
m0 and m1 from the adversary, the challenger
chooses random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and returns Enc(mb)
to the adversary. The adversary is allowed to
make key extraction and decryption queries after
submitting the challenge.
In the end, the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary wins the game if b′ = b and ID∗S and r
∗
S
were not subject of valid key extraction and decryption
queries. The adversary’s advantage is defined to be the
absolute value of the difference between 1/2 and its
probability of winning.
Type 2: The challenger runs GenS (1k1 ) and GenU (1k2 )
and gives PS and PU to the adversary. The adversary
then interleaves key extraction quires and decryption
queries with a single challenge query. These queries are
answered as follows:
• On key extraction queries (MSKU , PU , IDU ,
PS , IDS ), the challenger runs KGU , KGS and
outputs rU and rS corresponding to the identities
IDU and IDS .
• On decryption queries (PS , PU , IDU , IDS , rS , C),
the challenger checks that rS is the private key
related to IDS . If so, it generates rU and outputs
DecU (DecS (C)).
• On challenge query (PS , PU , ID∗U , ID
∗
S , m0, m1), the
challenger checks that r∗S is the private key
related to ID∗S . Then, upon receiving two messages
m0 and m1 from the adversary, the challenger
chooses random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and returns Enc(mb)
to the adversary. The adversary is allowed to
make key extraction and decryption queries after
submitting the challenge.
In the end, the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary wins the game if b′ = b and ID∗U and r
∗
U
were not subject of valid key extraction and decryption
queries.The adversary’s advantage is defined to be the
absolute value of the difference between 1/2 and its
probability of winning.
Definition 2. A generic mediated encryption system is
secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-
GME-CCA) if no PPT adversary has non-negligible
advantage in either Type 1 or Type 2.
Remark: Type 1 and Type 2 are IND-GME-CCA
secure if both IBES and IBEU are IND-ID-CCA secure.
If IBES and IBEU are IND-ID-CPA secure, then Type 1
and Type 2 are modified by eliminating the decryption
queries to get IND-GME-CPA security.
6.3. Security Proof
The security proof of GME is defined by the following
two theorems.
Theorem 1. If an adversary A who plays the role of a
revoked user has an advantage ε against GME, then this
adversary has the same advantage against IBES .
Theorem 2. If an adversary A who plays the role of a
hacked SEM has an advantage ε against GME, then this
adversary has the same advantage against IBEU .
Proof: Theorem 1 means that the game between an
adversary A who plays the role of a revoked user with
a challenger B against GME (Type 1) is identical to the
game between the same adversaryA and the challenger
B against IBES . To prove that, we rewrite Type 1 as
follows:
Type 1’:
• The Setup phase is the same as Type 1.
• Key extraction queries are the same as Type 1.
• Decryption queries are the same as Type 1.
• On challenge query (PS , PU , ID∗S , ID
∗
U , m0, m1), the
challenger checks that r∗U is the private key related
to ID∗U . Then, upon receiving two messages m0
andm1 from the adversary, the challenger chooses
a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and returns Enc(mb)
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to the adversary. Since the revoked user has
rU , he can partially decrypt the message to
get CS=EncS (m) where EncS is the SEM’s IBE
encryption algorithm.
In the end, the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary wins the game if b′ = b and ID∗S and r
∗
S
were not subject of valid key extraction and decryption
queries. The adversary’s advantage is defined to be the
absolute value of the difference between 1/2 and its
probability of winning. This concludes Type 1’.
From Type 1’, we can see that:
• Type 1’ represents a game against IBES because in
the challenge phase the adversary A has to attack
CS = EncS (m) to get the message m.
• The only difference between a game against GME
(in the case of a revoked user) and IBES is the
excess information of PU which does not give the
adversary any excessive information to identifym.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1. The proof of
Theorem 2 is similar.
7. Implementation of GME
Generally speaking, a GME system is produced by the
combination of two IBE systems. To prove that GME is
generic, we present GME in two different instantiations.
The first one is based on the BF FullIBE [7] which is a
pairing-based system. The other instantiation is based
on BGH IBE system [8] which is not a pairing-based
system. We first briefly review bilinear pairings and the
bilinear Diffi-Helman assumption which is the base of
the BF FullIBE security then we present GME using
BF FullIBE. After that, we briefly review some of the
security topics related to the BGH IBE system then we
represent GME using BGH IBE system. We note here
that the proposed GMEs systems use the same setup
and key generation algorithms for both the users and
SEM. I
7.1. Review on pairings
BF IBE [7] is based on bilinear map called a ‘pairing’.
The pairing which is often used to construct BF IBE is a
modified Weil or Tate pairing on a supersingular elliptic
curve or Abelian variety. However, we review pairings
and the related mathematics in a more general form
here.
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of a large
prime order q. G1 is an additive group and G2 is a
multiplicative group.
Admissible pairings: ê is called an admissible
pairing if ê : G1 ×G1 → G2 is a map with the following
properties:
• Bilinear: ê(aQ, bR)=ê(Q,R)ab for all Q,R ∈ G1 and
all a, b ∈ Z.
• Non-degenerate: ê(Q,R) , 1 for all Q,R ∈ G1.
• Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to
compute ê(Q,R) for any Q,R ∈ G1.
• Symmetric: ê(Q,R) = ê(R,Q) for any Q,R ∈ G1.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Parameter
Generator: A randomized algorithm IG is a BDH
parameter generator if IG takes a security parameter
k > 0, runs in time polynomial in k and outputs the
description of two groups G1 and G2 of the same prime
order q and the description of an admissible pairing
ê : G1 ×G1 → G2 [7].
BDH Problem: Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 as
well as aP , bP and cP (for unknown randomly chosen
a, b, c ∈ Zq), compute ê(P , P )abc.
For the BDH problem to be hard, G1 and G2 must
be chosen so that there is no known algorithm for
efficiently solving the Diffie-Hellman problem in either
G1 or G2.
BDH Assumption: If IG is a BDH parameter generator,
the advantage AdvIG(B) of algorithm B in solving the
BDH problem is defined to be the probability that the
algorithm B outputs ê(P , P )abc when the inputs to the
algorithm are G1, G2,ê,aP , bP and cP where (G1, G2,ê)
is IG’s output for large enough security parameter k,
P is a random generator of G1 and a, b, c are random
elements of Zq. The BDH assumption is that AdvIG(B)
is negligible for all efficient algorithms B [7].
7.2. GMEBF
Let k be the security parameter given to the setup
algorithm and let IG be a BDH parameter generator.
Setup: The public key generator (PKG) runs IG
on input k to generate groups G1, G2 of some prime
order q and an admissible pairing ê : G1 ×G1 → G2. It
picks an arbitrary generator P ∈ G1 and a master secret
s ∈ Zq and sets Ppup = sP and chooses cryptographic
hash functions H1{0, 1}∗ → G1, H2 : G1 → {0, 1}n,
H3 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → Zq and a hash function
H4 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n for some n. The system parameters
are P = (G1,G2, ê, P , Q, H1, H2, H3, H4). The message
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space isM = {0, 1}n. The master secret is s ∈ Zq.
KG: For given strings IDU , IDS ∈ {0, 1}∗, the PKG
computes QS = H1(IDS ) and QU = H1(IDU ) and sets
the private key rS = sQS and rU = sQU .
Enc: To encrypt a message m for a user with public
key IDU , compute QS = H1(IDS ) and QU = H1(IDU ).
After that, choose a random σ ∈ {0, 1}n and set r =
H3(σ,m). The ciphertext C is:
C = 〈rp, σ ⊕H2(grU ) ⊕H2(g
r
S ), m ⊕H4(σ ))〉
where gU = ê(QU , Ppub) and gS = ê(QS , Ppub).
Dec: To decrypt C = 〈U,V ,W 〉 for a user with public
key IDU , the user sends C to the SEM. If the user is
revoked, the SEM returns ⊥. If the user is not revoked,
the SEM calculates
CU = 〈U,V ⊕H2(ê(dS , U )),W 〉
and returns CU to the user. After receiving CU =
〈U,VU ,W 〉, the user computes VU ⊕H2(ê(dU , U )) = σ
andW ⊕H4(σ ) = m and sets r = H3(σ,m). He outputsm
as a decryption of C if U = rp. This concludes GMEBF .
Remark: A symmetric encryption E can be used instead
of Xor to encrypt the message m [7].
7.3. Security Proof
Lemma 2. Let A be a IND-CCA adversary that has
advantage ε against GMEBF . This adversary A can be
a revoked user or a hacked SEM. Then, there is an IND-
CCA adversary B with the same probability ε against
the BF FullIBE.
Proof. As shown in section 6.3.
7.4. Boneh-Gentry-Hanburg (BGH) system
Boneh, Gentry and Hamburg presented an anonymous
IND-ID-CPA secure system (BGH) [8]. Unlike Boneh-
Franklin system, this system is secure based on the
interactive quadratic residuosity (IQR) assumption. In
the following, we present the IQR assumption and the
core algorithm of the BGH system, then we present
GME based on that system.
7.5. The IQR assumption
For a positive integer n, define the following set:











is the Jacobi symbol of a w.r.t n [8]. The
Quadratic Residue set QR(n) is defined as follows
QR(n) = [a ∈ Zn : gcd(a, n) = 1 ∧ x2 ≡ a (mod n) has a
solution].
Definition 3. Interactive Quadratic Residuosity Assump-
tion: Let H be a collision free hash function such that
H : [0, 1]∗ → J(n). Let O be a square root oracle that





2 in Zn based on which value is
quadratic residue. The interactive quadratic residuosity
assumption holds for the pair (RSAgen,H) if for all PPT
algorithms A, the function IQRAdvA,(RSAgen(λ),H) =
|Pr[(n, V )← PQR(λ) : AO(n, V ) = 1]| − |Pr[(n, V )←
PNQR(λ) : AO(n, V ) = 1]|
is negligible. IQRAdvA,(RSAgen(λ),H) is the IQR advan-
tage of A against (RSAgen,H) [8].
7.6. QAlgorithm
Q is a deterministic algorithm with inputs (n, u, R, T )
where n ∈ Z+ and R, u, T ∈ Zn. This algorithm outputs
four polynomial functions f , f , g, τ ∈ Zn. This algo-
rithm must satisfy the following conditions :
• If R and T are quadratic residues, then f (r)g(t) is






• If uR and T are quadratic residues, then
f (r)g(t)τ(t) is also quadratic residue for all values
of r ← uR
1
2 and t ← T
1
2 .
• If R is quadratic residue, then f (r)f (−r)T is
quadratic residue for every r ← R
1
2 .
• If uR is quadratic residue, then f (r)f (−r)T is
quadratic residue for every r ← uR
1
2 .
• If T is quadratic residues, then τ(t)τ(−t)u is also
quadratic residue for all values of t ← T
1
2 .
• τ is independent of R, that is Q(n, u, R1, T ) and
Q(n, u, R2, T ) produces the same value of τ for any
value of n, u, R1, R2, T .
An example of Q is explained [8] as follows:
• Find a solution (x, y) ∈ Z2n to the equation Rx2 +
T y2 ≡ 1 (mod n).
• Find a solution (α, β) ∈ Z2n to the equation uα2 +
T β2 ≡ 1 (mod n).
• Calculate the polynomials f (r)← xr + 1, f (r)←
1 + T yβ + αxr , g(t)← 2yt + 2, τ(t) = 1 + βt.
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7.7. GMEBGH
• Setup(1k): Using RSAgen(1k), generate (p,q).
Calculate the modulus n← pq. Choose u ∈ J(n) \
QR(n) and choose a hash function H : ID ×
[1, l]→ J(n). The public parameters P are [n, u,H].
The master secret MSK parameters are p, q and
a secret key K for a pseudorandom function FK :
ID × [1, l]→ [0, 1, 2, 3].
• KG(MSK, IDU , IDS , l): Using the master secret
MSK , ID and the message length l, the private
keys (rU,i , rS,i) are generated using the key
generation algorithm.
Key Generation
foreach i ∈ [1, l] do
RU,i ← H(IDU , i) ∈ J(n)
RS,i ← H(IDS , i) ∈ J(n)
wU ← FK (IDU , i) ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3]
wS ← FK (IDS , i) ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3]
choose aU ∈ [0, 1] such that uaURU,i ∈ QR(n)
choose aS ∈ [0, 1] such that uaSRS,i ∈ QR(n)
let[zU,0, zU,1, zU,2, zU,3] be the four square roots
of uaURU,i ∈ Zn





The decryption key for the user U is dU ←
(P , rU,1, ..., rU,l) and the decryption key for the
SEM is dS ← (P , rS,1, ..., rS,l).
• Enc(P , IDU , IDS , m): Generate a random value
t ← Zn and calculate T ← t2 and then encrypt
m ∈ [−1, 1]l using P as shown in the encryption
algorithm. The ciphertext is C = (T , k, c) where
c = [c1, c2, ..., cl].
• Decrypt(C, dID ): To decrypt a ciphertext C =
(T , k, c) for a user with public key IDU , he sends
C to the SEM. The SEM then does the following:
• if U is revoked, the SEM returns ⊥.
• if U is not revoked, the SEM Calculates cU,i as
shown in SEM decryption algorithm.
and returns CU = [CU,1, CU,2, ..., CU,l] to the user.
Then he decrypts CU as shown in the user
decryption algorithm.
Encryption






foreach i ∈ [1, l] do
RU,i ← H(IDU , i) ∈ J(n)
RS,i ← H(IDS , i) ∈ J(n)
[xU,i , yU,i]← Q(n, u, RU,i , T )
[xS,i , yS,i]← Q(n, u, RS,i , T )
gU,i(t)← 2yU,it + 2
gS,i(t)← 2yS,it + 2












foreach i ∈ [1, l] do
RS,i ← H(IDS , i) ∈ J(n)
if r2S,i = RS,i then
[xS,i , yS,i]← Q(n, u, RS,i , T )
fS,i(rS,i)← xS,irS,i + 1






if r2S,i = uRS,i then
[xS,i , yS,i , α, β]← Q(n, u, RS,i , T )
f S,i(rS,i)← 1 + T 2i−1yS,iβ + αxS,irS,i
cU,i ← ci ·
(







foreach i ∈ [1, l] do
RU,i ← H(IDU , i) ∈ J(n)
if r2U,i = RU,i then
[xU,i , yU,i]← Q(n, u, RU,i , T )
fU,i(rU,i)← xU,irU,i + 1






if r2U,i = uRU,i then
[xU,i , yU,i , α, β]← Q(n, u, RU,i , T )
f U,i(rU,i)← 1 + T 2i−1yU,iβ + αxU,irU,i
mi ← ci ·
(






This concludes GMEBGH .
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7.8. Security Proof
Lemma 3. LetA be an Anon-IND-CPA adversary that has
advantage ε against GMEBGH . This adversary A can
be a revoked user or hacked SEM. Then, there is an
Anon-IND-CPA adversary B with the same probability
ε against the BGH system.
Proof. As shown in section 6.3.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the mediated structure of
the ID-MRSA which is a solution to the key revocation
problem. We showed that using a division intractable
hash function does not necessarily guarantee that the
generated public keys are also division intractable.
Consequently, the system may not be secure even if
the hash function used is division intractable. We
proposed two solutions to overcome this drawback.
After applying these modifications, the ID-MRSA is
secure in the random oracle model if the mapping
function parameters have been chosen correctly. After
that, we extended the idea of the ID-MRSA to be generic
by presenting a generic mediated encryption (GME)
system that converts any IBE system to a mediated
system. Although it is based on double encryption, our
system is efficient. The ciphertext size is the same as
a single IBE. It combines the advantage of CBE and
SEM structures. Our system is more efficient than CBE
because it does not depend on certificates and it is more
secure than [6] and [15] because the SEM in GME is not
a single point of failure and can be untrusted. We prove
that GME is as secure as the IBE system used in the case
of a revoked user or a hacked SEM.
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